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WILD HORSES AND BURROS ACT
PREEMPTS STATE AUTHORITY

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Property clause of Constitution held to
give Congress power to regulate Wild Horses and Burros on Federal
Land and pre-empt State Legislation over same. Kleppe v. New
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,49 L.Ed.2d 34, 96 S.Ct. 2285 (1976).
The Congressional finding and purpose of Chapter 30, Protection
of Wild Horses and Burros is "that wild free-roaming horses and
burros are living symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the
West: that they contribute to the diversity of life forms within the
Nation and enrich the lives of the American people; and that these
horses and burros are fast disappearing from the American Scene. It
is the policy of Congress that wild free-roaming horses and burros
shall be protected from capture, branding, harassment, or death; and
to accomplish this they are to be considered in the area where presently found, as an integral part of the natural system of the public
lands."'
In order to accomplish the protection of wild horses and burros
and establish some form of regulatory agency for enforcing this Act,
Congress began by giving the Secretary of the Interior the authorization to proclaim such regulation.2 Thus, on August 7, 1973, the
Secretary of the Interior executed an agreement with the New Mexico Livestock Board, the agency which enforces the New Mexico
Estray Laws. 3 This agreement acknowledged the Secretary's authority to manage and protect any wild free-roaming horses and burros
and established the procedures for the claims of private parties.
The problem began when some three months later the New Mexico Livestock Board terminated the agreement by claiming that the
Federal Government had no power over the control of the wild
horses and burros on federal land. This conflict was raised in Court
when on February 1, 1974, a New Mexico rancher, Kelley Stephenson, reported to the Livestock Board that wild burros were interfering with his livestock operation. The land on which the wild burros
had been seen was federal property which Stephenson had access to
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1336 (1970).
3. NMSA (1953) § 47-14-1 et seq.
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by a special permit issued under the Taylor Grazing Act.4 The New
Mexico Livestock Board answered Stephenson's complaint by rounding up 19 wild burros and then proceeded to dispose of the animals
by its usual practice, an auction, held on February 18, 1974. The
Bureau of Land Management then asserted jurisdiction and demanded the Board return the burros to public lands.
On March 4, 1974, the New Mexico Livestock Board filed suit in
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
seeking a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of the Wild
Horses and Burros Act and an injunction against any further enforcement of the Act by. the Secretary of the Interior. The three judge
court held the Fourth Article of the Constitution gives Congress only
the power to regulate public lands and protect them from damage.
The Court ruled that Congress had exceeded its power by attempting
to regulate and protect the animals that lived on the public lands.
The court went on to permanently enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from enforcing any provisions of the Act.
Justice Marshall, for a unanimous Court, held that Congress had
the power to decide whether the Property Clause did apply for
"needful" regulations "respecting" the public lands.
New Mexico argued that the Property Clause did not support the
Act and attempted to base the argument on a strict reading of several
cases. The Court, in reviewing the argument, carried it to the conclusion that Congress lacks the power to act contrary to state law.
Finding such an argument to be without merit, the Court went on to
interpret New Mexico's argument to show that the outcome of such
an argument would question Congress' derivative legislative powers.
Legislative jurisdiction is acquired from a range of exclusive federal
jurisdiction. By enacting federal legislation, Congress automatically
overrides conflicting state law under the Supremacy Clause.
New Mexico's other argument attempted to deny Congress exclusive jurisdiction over the federal lands within the border of the State
of New Mexico. The cases relied upon by New Mexico were noted by
the Court to be contrary to its argument. Furthermore, the Court
conceded that the Act did not establish exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the public lands in New Mexico. The Act simply overrode the
portion of the New Mexico Estray Law by its regulation of federally
protected animals. New Mexico contended that the Act violated any
traditional state power over wild animals. The Court refuted this
argument by explaining the state still had all its trustee and police
powers over wild animals, adding that this was only restrained by the
4. 48 Stat. 1270, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1970).
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rights given to the Federal Government by the Constitution. The
Court concluded the Property Clause gives Congress the power to
protect wildlife on public lands, state law notwithstanding.
The fourth and final section of the opinion does not limit interpretafions and applications of the case to Property Clause questions
of the future. Because this was a declaratory judgment proceeding,
the Court thought it inappropriate to determine the extent, if any, to
which the Property Clause does empower Congress to protect animals on private lands. Whether such regulation is even attempted by
the Act is also a question left for future litigation.
New Mexico expressed concern that the Act might be read to
provide federal jurisdiction over every wild horse or burro that might
at any time set foot upon federal land. The Court declined the
opportunity to decide this question, explaining that it is the practice
of the Court to leave open questions regarding the scope and constitutionality of legislation whenever such question is outside the
context of a concrete case.
Thus, while the ruling in this particular case supports protection of
wild horses and burros on Federal lands, the question of the permissible reach of the Act over private lands is still unanswered.
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